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ABSTRACT 
 Property is rare in most nonhuman primates, most likely because their lifestyles 
are not conducive to it.  Nonetheless, just because these species do not frequently 
maintain property does not mean that they lack the propensity to do so.  Primates show 
respect for possession, as well as behaviors related to property, such as irrational decision 
making regarding property (e.g. the endowment effect) and barter.  The limiting factor in 
species other than humans is likely the lack of social and institutional controls for 
maintaining property.  By comparing primates and humans, we gain a better 
understanding of how human property concepts have evolved. 
  
 
 Property is a concept taken almost for granted among modern Western peoples (at 
least, until there is a dispute over it).  We not only have an intuitive understanding of 
mine and yours, but also a series of social norms, rules, and governance structures set up 
to manage the relationships dictated by the presence of property.  Yet for all of our focus 
on property, little is known about how this concept evolved.  How did we become the 
only species on earth to have these complex rules of ownership and succession?  It is 
possible that our sense of property is emergent in humans, a result of our cognitive 
complexity or advanced culture (e.g. Noles & Keil, this volume; Kalish and Anderson, 
this volume).  On the other hand, it is also possible that these complexities are 
continuations of the basic property or possession behaviors seen in some other species.   
In fact, there are other species which seem to have at least elements of a sense of 
property (Stake, 2004).  Among primates, there is evidence for a sense of property both 
from observations and from experimental situations. Notably, several primate species 
behave as though objects in the possession of others belong to that individual (Kummer 
& Cords, 1990; Sigg & Falett, 1985). Moreover caching species, such as jays and 
kangaroo rats, hide food items for later retrieval, and may even move them around to 
avoid snooping competitors (Dally, Emery, & Clayton, 2006; Emery & Clayton, 2001; 
Preston & Jacobs, 2005).  Many of these caching species are phylogenetically quite 
distantly related to humans, indicating that this behavior emerged in several species based 
on similar ecological constraints, known in evolutionary terms as convergence1, and may 
be widespread through the animal kingdom.   
To understand the emergence of our sense of property, it is useful to explore the 
behavior both broadly within the animal kingdom and more specifically among other 
primate species, particularly the apes, as they are our closest phylogenetic kin.  Studying 
how property in these species is different from (or similar to) that of other species, 
especially in concert with an understanding of the environmental characteristics which 
may have led to convergences, can help clarify how the human property concept evolved. 
1. Defining property 
 Among humans, the law is the institution perhaps most interested in property, and 
so a good starting point.  The law defines property with respect to the relationship 
between people that gives rise to the agreement that one object is mine and another is 
yours (Bentham, 1914).  Bentham went so far as to assert that property did not exist 
before the laws regulating it.  However, this definition conflicts with the folk notion of 
property as a relationship between an object and a person, and denies out of hand the 
possibility that property could be based on behaviors or concepts present in other species 
(Stake, 2004).   
                                                 
1 Convergence is an evolutionary mechanism in which different species evolve similar characteristics (here, 
property-related behaviors) because of similar environmental constraints.  The other mechanism I discuss is 
homology, in which different species share similar characteristics because both are descended from a 
common ancestor who displayed the behavior.  As a simple example, both blue jays and eagles share wings 
through homology, because their mutual common ancestor to both species also had wings.  On the other 
hand, blue jays, bats, and butterflies all have wings through convergence; their mutual common ancestor 
did not have wings.  Instead the benefits of taking advantage of an open ecological niche, the air, provided 
pressure which increased the likelihood of wings developing as the appropriate mutations arose. Note that a 
close phylogenetic relationship may imply a homologous relationship, but does not guarantee it; the traits 
could also have arisen independently through convergent processes. While the distinction is critical and 
often overlooked, for the purposes of this paper it is largely irrelevant whether a particular shared trait 
evolved through homologous or convergent processes, because we are interested in the presence or absence 
of property-related behaviors in other species and are not developing a phylogenetic tree based on this data 
to trace the evolution of these behaviors 
 There is evidence in favor of this latter position.  Children as young as eighteen to 
twenty-four months of age show inferences about the ownership of property (Fasig, 
2000).  Such inferences may be due to mechanisms such as following the heuristic that 
the first possessor of an object is the owner (Friedman & Neary, 2007; Friedman et al, 
this volume).  While even at this early age ideas about ownership could be learned 
through interactions with adults of the species, this early start indicates the possibility of 
a predisposition towards property. Moreover, other species seem to have some basic 
behaviors which are consistent with the idea that a thing can belong to a specific 
individual.  For instance, some species show begging and sharing behavior in relation to 
food, instead of simply taking by force the food that is desired (e.g. chimpanzees; 
Goodall, 1986), which indicates that food is seen as having an owner.  Several species of 
nonhuman primates behave as if possession is a special state.  In these primates, 
individuals do not attempt to take objects which are in another’s possession, even if the 
possessor is the subordinate individual (Kummer, 1991; Kummer & Cords, 1990).  
Interestingly, the United States legal system also prioritizes possession when dealing with 
property disputes (Stake, 2004). This phenomenon, termed respect for possession, will be 
discussed in more detail later, but provides strong evidence for a basic sense of property 
shared between humans and other species.   
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that possession of property is not an 
emergent property of human institutions, in particular the legal system, and that some 
precursors to the behaviors and attitudes which led to property as seen in the human sense 
can be seen in other species.  Looking for these precursor behaviors in other species can 
help to identify the ways in which property evolved and pin down criteria which may be 
important for the development of the concept of property.  To begin, we first need an 
operational definition of what is meant by property and which specific behaviors would 
be evidence for its presence. 
 In order to maintain property, an individual needs to maintain control over an 
object which is not a part of its body.  Of course, property can be lost, stolen or 
transferred, so permanent maintenance of access is not a necessary requirement for 
property.  From a biological perspective, there are two different forms of property, that 
which is physically in one’s possession, and that which is maintained despite being 
outside of one’s physical control.  For the sake of simplicity, I refer to these, respectively, 
as possession and ownership. 
 Maintaining possession is likely the simplest form of property.  In this case, an 
individual maintains an item by keeping that item under its physical control at all times.  
Functionally, this is defined as the individual touching the item in some way (in an 
appendage, mouth, beak, etc).  Although in the most trivial sense, this form of property is 
essentially ubiquitous, as any time an individual picks up a piece of food to consume, it is 
in its possession, possession also extends beyond this.  Individuals may maintain 
possession for more extended periods of time, in which case norms or standards of 
conduct, for how items in another’s possession should be treated may be formed.  For 
instance, among ravens, individuals who possess an item can expect to maintain it, even 
if a larger or otherwise more dominant individual approaches.  These norms are upheld 
through third-party interactions in which uninvolved third parties will attack those who 
steal from another raven (Heinrich, 1999).  Such norms indicate that possession has a 
special status in these species.  
 The second form of property, ownership, is that over which one maintains control 
even when the item is not in one’s possession.  This may include such resources as dens, 
nests, or home ranges, although these are typically group resources which are defended 
by and shared by all the members of the social group.  In a few species, ownership 
includes another critical resource, food.  In species which cache food items, such as 
squirrels, individuals maintain property without possession, and reclaim those objects 
when they need them for survival, such as in the scrub jays discussed above.  Note that 
such property need not be due to respect for ownership; in many cases property may 
remain under the individual’s control either because it is hidden from others, or because 
the individual who has ownership or possession is dominant, so others cannot easily take 
the items. 
 What seems to set human property apart from that of other species is the extensive 
reliance on the goodwill of others to assist in the maintenance of ownership (e.g. property 
outside of one’s possession) through third-party reinforcement.  In humans, this takes the 
form of both institutional structures to maintain ownership rights (police forces, legal 
systems) and the tendency of humans to respect each other’s property ownership.  As 
mentioned above with respect to the ravens, third party norms do exist in other species, 
but typically only for current possessions, and not with respect to ownership. This may be 
due to the inability of other species to convey information beyond the immediate, as can 
be done with language.  This means that third-party interventions can only occur in 
situations in which the transgression was witnessed by a potential supporter (Brosnan, 
Grady, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Beran, 2008).  Moreover, while many of us may resort to 
the legal system to reclaim property which has been taken from us, the truth is that in a 
well-functioning society, this recourse is required surprisingly rarely, particularly with 
respect to how often property we own is left outside of our immediate possession.  People 
routinely leave their jackets on a seat during the intermission at a play or their grill on the 
deck of their house or apartment and seem to expect that these items will still be there 
upon their return.  And in fact, they usually are.  The question, then, is what is it that 
makes human property so different? 
2. Property in primates 
 Property in primates is rare, and exists almost exclusively in the form of 
possession, not ownership.  Primates do maintain territories, or home ranges, sometimes 
individually and sometimes in groups.  These can be considered a form of property, 
although given the frequency of territorial behavior across the animal kingdom, this tells 
us little specific about the evolution of property.  Unlike some other animals, no primate 
(outside of some humans) relies on caching as a major food source.  This is most likely 
an ecological constraint.  Food is the most obvious object for animals to store as property, 
as it is essential for survival.  However, primates typically live in areas where at least 
some food source is available year-round, allowing them to forage for food as they need 
it.  Moreover, caching is impractical for most primates; they typically eat foods which do 
not store well, such as fruit, negating the utility of maintaining food for any extended 
period before consuming it.  Thus, the opportunities for food as property, particularly in 
the form of ownership, are limited. 
 Primates behave in other ways which are indicative of some concept of possession.  
One primary manifestation is the remarkable respect for the rights of the possessor of an 
object shown by some species (Kummer, 1991; Kummer & Cords, 1990). Chimpanzees 
show a ‘respect for possession’ which allows individuals to maintain possession of an 
item, even in the presence of the alpha male (Goodall, 1972).  This ability is not limited 
to the apes, either.  Several monkey species show evidence of respect of food possession 
(Perry, 1997; Sigg & Falett, 1985).  Outside of the realm of food, hamadryas baboon 
males show respect for the females in each other’s harems (Kummer, Götz, & Angst, 
1974), not attempting to mate with them or claim them even though these harem units 
interact with each other on a daily basis.   
What qualifies as ‘possession’ varies between species.  In some species, even 
holding an object is not sufficient; individuals must be able to transport the object in 
order for others to respect possession. In an experimental study, long-tailed macaques 
respected ownership when the owner had possession and was able to carry the object.  
Respect for possession broke down, though, even when the owner had possession of the 
object, in two cases.  First was if the possessor could not carry it with them because it 
was tethered to the floor.  Second was if the object had a trailing string (similar to a kite 
tail) which extended beyond the possessor’s immediate vicinity.  In either case, the more 
dominant individual typically took control of the object.  In these macaques, proximity 
was also not sufficient to maintain possession (Kummer & Cords, 1990).   
Not all species have such stringent requirements for possession.  Among 
hamadryas baboons, proximity is sufficient to trigger respect for possession, and in some 
cases even the memory of a previous possession may be sufficient to trigger this response 
(Sigg & Falett, 1985; see also Friedman et al, this volume).  This variation in 
experimental outcomes is most likely due to differences in the socio-ecology of the 
different species.  Hamadryas baboons evolved in a situation in which a valuable 
possession (e.g. harem females) was in proximity, but not under physical control, 
widening the concept of possession in this species. 
 One of the challenges in assessing possession is that it is difficult to determine 
whether possession is respected as a norm versus for more prosaic self-serving reasons.  
In many cases, it appears that non-norm based accounts exist to explain animals’ 
interactions over possessions.  For instance, food calls may serve to identify possession, 
which could indicate a norm.  On the other hand, the food call may also indicate how 
likely a challenge is from the possessor.  Thus, failure to obtain the food after hearing a 
food call may be due to non-possessors avoiding a potential fight rather than respect for 
possession (Gros-Luis, 2004; Krebs, 1982).  Similarly, among chimpanzees it has been 
hypothesized that the intense motivation to keep a food reward is what allows lower-
ranking individuals to sometimes maintain possession of a carcass following a monkey 
hunt, rather than a social norm respecting possession (Goodall, 1986).  Finally, it is also 
likely that ‘possession norms’ are due at least in part to reciprocity.  High ranking 
individuals may refrain from taking the property of those who rank below them in order 
to keep those lower-ranking individuals as grooming or mating partners (de Waal, 2005).   
These different mechanisms make assessing ‘pure’ respect for possession difficult.  
Humans, too, may fail to take resources for many of these same reasons. However, there 
are some situations in which the evidence does indicate the presence of social norms 
related to possession.  In some species, third party interventions may reduce the 
frequency with which owners are challenged for their possessions.  Although in these 
cases the non-possessor may not attack for self-serving reasons, the fact that a third party 
intervenes indicates the presence of possession-related norms. Among long-tailed 
macaques, possession was more likely to be challenged for older possessors, who are less 
likely to scream and, hence, attract support, which the authors propose as evidence of 
third-party norms supporting possession rights (Kummer & Cords, 1990).   
However, none of these studies gets at ownership, or possessions outside of one’s 
immediate control.  This is partly due to the lack of situations in which ownership 
appears in the wild.  Thus an alternative approach, which allows for more explicit control, 
is to investigate these phenomena in the laboratory.  In fact, chimpanzees do seem to 
recognize that they ‘own’ something beyond their immediate possession in the laboratory.  
Although in laboratory studies subjects are typically given a food reward for each desired 
response, chimpanzees are willing to work for rewards (food items or tokens) which 
collect in a specified location and then are given to the subjects en masse (Wolfe, 1937; 
Cowles, 1937; Sousa & Matsuzawa, 2001).  This indicates that, at least on some level, the 
chimpanzees understand that the rewards are ‘theirs,’ even though they are not in their 
possession.  Chimpanzees understand this even if there are several collections of tokens 
or food, only one of which contains items which are ‘theirs.’ 
As part of another study, chimpanzees were tested in pairs in which each 
individual could trade tokens for food rewards.  These tokens consisted of symbols which 
represented various foods which were made available in the study; these symbols had 
been used by each of the chimpanzees since infancy and so had strong associations.  The 
chimpanzees each had a separate food bin, with different food items available to them 
than were available to their partners.  Each could obtain only the foods that were present 
in their bin by trading the appropriate token for it, despite being able to see their partner’s 
available foods.  Moreover, all tokens for foods available for either chimpanzee were 
available at all times, so chimpanzees had access to tokens which did not match their 
available food rewards. The only cost to these incorrect trades was time; the chimpanzees 
were allowed an unlimited number of exchanges to acquire their foods.  Despite this, the 
chimpanzees learned very rapidly that they could acquire the foods only from their own 
bin, and did not request the foods from their partners’ bins (Brosnan & Beran, 2009).  
This indicates that that they understood at least on some level that those foods were not 
‘theirs,’ as determined by the experimenter. 
Even so, this still does not fully get at ownership, as the human experimenter 
acted as a mediator.  One difficulty with testing property in chimpanzees is that while 
food items represent the strongest level of motivation, because of this they are also 
unlikely to hold them for a long period of time without eating them.  Thus it is difficult to 
use food items as part of a study involving property.  However, with a little creativity, 
certain aspects of property may be tested using paradigms which get around the problems 
inherent in food.  For instance, tokens can be used which represent foods (and can later 
be traded for foods, as in the above study) or food which cannot be consumed 
immediately can be used.  Both of these approaches have been used successfully, as is 
discussed below. 
 2.1 The Endowment Effect.  The issue of property can be addressed tangentially, 
by testing for characteristics of property known to be exhibited by humans.  One common 
finding is that humans tend to behave irrationally when making decisions about their 
property.  One way in which this manifests is in a phenomenon referred to as the 
endowment effect, in which individuals will pay more to keep an item that is in their 
possession than they would have previously paid to obtain the same item.  This implies 
that individuals value what is in their possession simply because of that fact, even when 
there has not been enough time to develop a sentimental attachment to it or additional 
uses for it (Jones & Brosnan, 2008; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990).   
 Chimpanzees, too, increase their preference for items in their possession above 
and beyond the value they indicated when the object was not in their possession (Brosnan, 
Jones, Mareno, Richardson, Shapiro et al., 2007).  In this study, chimpanzees were given 
a series of sessions to determine how preferences changed dependent upon possession.  
One session served to verify their preferences, while additional sessions offered them 
opportunities to exchange what they were given initially for something else.  There was 
no cost to trading other than the few seconds the trade took.  To make sure that the 
chimpanzees were sufficiently motivated, foods were used instead of tokens representing 
foods.  The chosen foods were difficult to consume rapidly; one item was peanut butter 
that had to be removed from a PVC tube and the other was a frozen juice stick that 
subjects preferred not to bite into.   
To establish preferences, chimpanzees were asked to choose between the two 
foods.  To determine whether or not the chimpanzees preferred to maintain possession of 
those items which they had in their possession, chimpanzees were given each of the items 
individually (in separate sessions) and then immediately offered the opportunity to 
exchange for the other2. As with humans, as a group chimpanzees were more likely to 
hold onto whichever food item they were given than was expected, based on their 
preference for the items in the choice session.  Individually, almost half of the 
chimpanzees followed this pattern, choosing to hold onto whichever item they had been 
                                                 
2 In the experiment itself, the order of presentation of these three sessions were randomized among the 36 
subjects to assure that there was no ordering effect influencing responses. 
given.  All chimpanzees were willing to exchange food items away when something of 
greater value (a banana) was offered, so their disinclination to exchange cannot be 
explained by concern about the risks inherent in trading away food or the reliability of the 
human experimenter.   
Interestingly, this holds for foods, but not for other non-food objects with which 
they interact.  When the same study was repeated using two familiar toys, the 
chimpanzees actually preferred to exchange, perhaps valuing the interaction with the 
experimenter over the possibilities of the toys themselves (Brosnan, Jones, Mareno, 
Richardson, Lambeth et al., 2007).  This indicates that the endowment effect may hold 
only for those objects which have great utility to the chimpanzees, such as food, and 
indicates that even within a concept as basic as property, the context of the interaction 
matters. 
More recently, similar studies have been done with orangutans and capuchin 
monkeys, indicating that they, too, show an endowment effect (Flemming, Jones, 
Stoinski, Mayo, & Brosnan, in review; Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2008). 
Capuchin monkeys also exhibit loss aversion, showing a preference for outcomes framed 
as a reward over those framed as a loss despite the actual distribution of outcomes being 
equal (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006).  This is another ‘irrational’ behavior 
which is often linked with the endowment effect.  Taken with the results on chimpanzees, 
it appears that this suite of irrational behaviors occurs in primates in general, supporting 
the idea that concepts of property are broadly distributed in the primates, and likely 
throughout the animal kingdom. 
 2.2 Barter.  Another element of property is that it can be used to obtain more or 
different property through trade and barter.  In barter, an individual can trade an object in 
their possession or under their ownership for another object possessed or owned by 
someone else.   In fact, this, in concert with specialization, is one of the core tenets of 
economic theory.  As such, there has been quite a bit of interest in whether other species 
can barter. Adam Smith famously quoted that “It [barter, to exchange one thing for 
another] is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem 
to know neither this nor any other species of contracts… Nobody ever saw a dog make a 
fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog” (Smith 1776).  
Barter has not been reported in wild populations, however chimpanzees and other species 
do share food (e.g. Hockings et al, 2007; Feistner & McGrew, 1989), which is a related 
behavior.  There are also a few captive observations of spontaneous behavior which may 
indicate the presence of exchange behavior in primates (Paquette, 1992). 
Most studies thus far have required subjects to trade a token to a human 
experimenter for another food item, which both chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys do 
easily (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004, 2005; Hyatt & Hopkins, 1998).  In fact, both of these 
species also seem to understand the tokens as symbols, and can work with them flexibly 
(Addessi, Crescimbene, & Visalberghi, 2007; Addessi, Mancini, Crescimbene, Padoa-
Schioppa, & Visalberghi, 2008; Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & Boysen, 1978).  
However, this only indicates that primates can learn associations, but does not require the 
subject to actually give up something of value to obtain something else.  It is this latter, 
more costly, exchange behavior that we typically consider when discussing barter. 
Several studies on barter of food items have found that chimpanzees are not only 
able to do this, but are very intelligent in how they barter with humans (Lefebvre, 1982; 
Lefebvre & Hewitt, 1986).  In these studies, chimpanzees were rational, trading foods 
they did not like for those which they did, and trading more readily when the difference 
in value between the food items was greater.  They were also intelligent; the 
experimenter would take any size food item in exchange for another, and the 
chimpanzees learned to return very small bits of food, or even just a daub of saliva. This 
behavior maximized their intake of both foods.  A recent study replicated these findings 
with a larger adult sample of chimpanzees (Brosnan, Grady, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Beran, 
2008).  In this study, chimpanzees received an endowment of 30 food items (of varying 
types) and were given the opportunity to exchange those items for other food items.  
Again, chimpanzees never traded food items for those which were less preferred, and 
they always traded disfavored foods for much more preferred items.  When food items 
were close in value, subjects typically did not exchange.  This behavior, similar to that 
seen in the endowment effect study discussed above, indicates that chimpanzees are 
hesitant to give up an item in their possession, possibly because of the risks of trade. 
 Note that all of the studies on barter discussed above have one significant 
confound – they all involve trading with humans, rather than a subject of the same 
species.  This makes it difficult to extrapolate their behavior to natural circumstances, due 
to the difference in the type of relationship between primate conspecifics (e.g. members 
of the same species) and primates and humans.  In the latter, the humans occupy an 
atypical, omniscient/omnipotent role which may make the monkeys and apes react 
differently than they would to a conspecific. However, human/primate barter is the norm 
because of the difficulty inherent in getting primates to give up a food reward to another 
individual.  Even a well-trained chimpanzee is unlikely to voluntarily trade away a 
preferred food item in their possession for another.  This can be avoided through the use 
of symbolic tokens, rather than foods.   
 In a recent study, chimpanzees were given tokens which bore symbols 
representing foods, rather than the food items themselves (Brosnan & Beran, 2009; also 
see above).  These chimpanzees had trained to use these symbols as infants, and each 
subject had at least 20 years’ experience with them, so they easily understood the 
token/food associations (controls were run to verify that this was the case).  In a series of 
studies, chimpanzees were given several tokens.  Some of these could be exchanged with 
the experimenter to obtain foods, while others were worthless to them, but could be used 
by another chimpanzee (their partner).  Although chimpanzees initially were hesitant to 
do so, they ultimately learned to trade tokens amongst themselves prior to exchanging 
tokens for foods with the experimenter, which maximized the number of foods each 
chimpanzee could receive.  During this time there was experimenter oversight of the 
interactions; the experimenter would not exchange with either ape until each chimpanzee 
had traded a token of their choice with their partner (they could simply return the token 
their partner had given to them).  Once experimenter oversight was removed, though, all 
trade behavior ceased within the first session.  Instead, the chimpanzees simply returned 
all of their tokens to the experimenter, and received many fewer food items than were 
available. 
This test indicates two interesting findings.  First, chimpanzees are capable of 
cognitively understanding trade, and will do so in a way which benefits themselves and 
their partner.  Second, experimenter control is apparently necessary for successful barter 
among captive adult chimpanzees.  These together indicate that there is significant risk 
inherent in trading among chimpanzees.  This may be due to the lack of recourse if the 
partner fails to complete the trade.  Humans have solved this problem through the 
introduction of legal and policing systems which can enforce appropriate trade behavior 
on others, minimizing the risk of any given interaction.  Chimpanzees, lacking the ability 
to communicate beyond the immediate (e.g. narrative language), would have difficulty 
with third-party reinforcement except in situations in which the third party witnessed the 
interaction (Brosnan, Grady, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Beran, 2008). Thus it is likely that, 
despite an apparent lack of cognitive limitations, trading behavior has not evolved due to 
the high costs inherent in a trading system without oversight and recourse.  It is possible 
that other species, which have less competitive social interactions, may show more of a 
tendency towards barter behavior, but it is likely that the lack of narrative language limits 
the development of extensive barter in all species besides humans. 
3. Conclusion 
Taken as a whole, the evidence supports the idea that, counter to Bentham’s 
assertion, there are biological bases for property.  While no other species has developed a 
system of property ownership as complex and far-reaching as humans have, non-human 
primates appear to have expectations related to objects, or social norms, which are in 
their or another’s possession.  This possession-centered concept of property makes 
evolutionary sense; not only is it easier to defend property which is in one’s possession, 
but the legal enforcements required for ownership are difficult or impossible to enforce 
without the development of language.   
Norms regarding possession are not the only property-related feature shared 
between humans and other species. Experimental studies in nonhuman primates have 
found evidence of behaviors (such as barter) and psychological features (such as the 
endowment effect) which are seen in human property-related behavior.  Perhaps the 
critical difference between humans and other species is that in other species, individuals 
may assume that they will need to enforce their right to their property by themselves, 
without any recourse, while in humans we can rely on others to assist in maintaining our 
property rights.  Even if other species have the necessary cognitive underpinnings, such 
as third-party enforcement of norms or well developed reciprocity, they still lack the 
ability to communicate about other individuals’ misdeeds.  This limits their ability either 
to request assistance in reclaiming property or to warn others about those who do not 
respect property, which seriously limits the extent to which these norms may develop. 
Thus, the critical development for humans may have been the emergence of two 
features; first, a norm which indicates that property outside of one’s immediate 
possession or control is still property, and should not be taken by others (e.g. ownership; 
see also Rochat, this volume), and second, the language skills necessary to recruit the 
support of others in the maintenance of this norm.  Together these could have led to the 
development of formalized legal systems which protect ownership of property even when 
it is outside of one’s immediate control or when an instance of theft takes place beyond 
the observation of others.  Although human property concepts differ from those of other 
species, this comparative approach sheds light on the biological basis of the emergence of 
property in humans and other animals. 
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